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This In Brief considers Indonesian President Joko 
Widodo’s policy actions in Papua. It demonstrates 
that over the past few months of the new presidency, 
the rhetoric on Papua has not matched the reality of 
policy changes and political moves taking place. It 
concludes that whether the president is deliberately 
misleading Papuans or powerless to implement pro-
gressive changes, he is contributing to tensions amid 
a military build-up that could spell disaster. 
Responding to calls for media freedom in Papua, 
the president, popularly referred to as Jokowi, 
announced in May 2015 that foreign journalists 
would no longer require special permits to visit 
Papua/West Papua, and that he had informed all 
the relevant ministers and officials, including the 
military, of his decision.1 Yet within a day of the 
announcement, two ministers and a high-ranking 
military official made pronouncements contradicting 
Jokowi’s decision, effectively stating permits would 
still be required, and that journalist’s content would 
have to be screened to ensure ‘balanced’ reporting 
in line with ‘codes of conduct’. More recently, Jokowi 
announced an end to the controversial transmigra-
tion program that sees mainly Javanese farmers relo-
cated to Papua and contributes to a feeling among 
Papuans of becoming a minority in their own land. 
But again his ministers publicly contradicted his 
announcement. These incidents affirmed that there 
are divergent interests and agendas at work in Indo-
nesian politics. 
Jokowi came to his presidential campaign 
with a reputation for being a humble problem-
solver during his time as governor of Jakarta. He 
turned his attention to Papua, perhaps naively, as a 
problem worth solving. After making history as the 
first presidential candidate to open his campaign 
in Papua, Jokowi spoke of the need for a new era 
of openness. His attention to the region left some 
Papuans and others thinking that he could generate 
some progress on longstanding grievances. Yet 
after winning the election, he appointed Ryamizard 
Ryacudu, a former general, as Minister of Defense 
and signed off on far-reaching security policies. 
These new policies take the military into more 
regions of Papua/West Papua, in greater numbers, 
with permanent bases, and with less oversight 
from Jakarta — exactly the opposite of what most 
analysts say is needed to overcome abuses of power 
(e.g. Human Rights Watch 2007). Jokowi also failed 
to address an incident that occurred in Papua mere 
weeks after he took his oath when unarmed school 
students were reportedly shot by police during a 
protest against military abuses. Hopes in Jokowi 
were, for many, dashed, as police began to deny 
involvement, and there was only silence from the 
president, affirming what many Papuans had said 
during the election: that no Indonesian politician 
would ever really stand up for them. 
Jokowi acknowledged Papuans’ feelings of 
marginalisation within the nation during the 2014  
election campaign (Munro 2014). Yet he and 
Foreign Minister Marsudi then spent the first few 
months of his presidency challenging Papuans’ 
claims to Melanesian cultural identity, arguing that 
Papuans have no special relationship to Melanesia; 
rather, there are about 9.5 million other Melanesians 
in Indonesia. This claim emerged as the government 
redoubled its efforts to thwart Papuans’ bid for 
member status in the Melanesian Spearhead Group 
(MSG) — an informal regional organisation in 
which several member states support Papuan 
independence. Instead, Jokowi proposed that 
Indonesia’s ‘five Melanesian provinces’ bid together 
for member status under Indonesia. Jokowi and 
Marsudi campaigned against the bid by the United 
Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) in 
the Pacific, dropping millions in ‘aid’ promises in 
several MSG countries. Indonesia must be deeply 
concerned about the prospect of the ULMWP 
gaining political recognition from the MSG, because 
politicians such as Jokowi are suddenly eager to 
embrace the Melanesian heritage that is often the 
butt of racist taunts and discriminatory practices in 
Indonesia (Munro 2015). 
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These actions do not seem to fit the pattern of 
a president who is powerless or naïve. Rather, they 
show a continuation of practices towards Papua 
that say one thing and do another, even if Jokowi is 
bent on saying and doing more than his predeces-
sor, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Contradiction, 
or, some might say, duplicity, continues to define 
Indonesian governance in Papua, especially in mat-
ters of decentralisation (Chauvel 2011) and develop-
ment (Stasch 2015). There are government officials, 
such as Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal 
and Security Affairs, Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, who 
continue to argue that Indonesia is implementing a 
‘welfare’ policy in Papua, not a ‘security’ policy, in 
the face of potent evidence to the contrary, includ-
ing statements from within the military. But these 
sorts of views are not contradictory if government 
officials actually believe in the myth of Indonesian 
benevolence in Papua. Recent comments concern-
ing media freedom similarly reflect this myth, as 
officials argue that the only real problem in Papua 
is foreign journalists looking for bad news. There is 
a reason why ‘straightening out history’ and ‘telling 
the truth’ are among Papuan activists and scholars 
foremost political demands (Giay 2000).
In the past, an atmosphere of political 
contradictions, elevated hopes, and high levels of 
militarisation contributed to the worst documented 
clashes between indigenous locals and Indonesian 
migrants in Papua’s history (Mote and Rutherford 
2001). The stakes are high for ULMWP activists 
and their many supporters who have been working 
towards political recognition by the MSG, which 
is set to make a decision in June. Jokowi has been 
fanning the flames of optimism by visiting Papua, 
and through announcements on media freedom 
and transmigration, but he and those around him 
are also working to advance repression, particularly 
by expanding military powers, putting pressure 
on the MSG, and arresting activists. We could 
give Jokowi the benefit of the doubt, and say that 
so far his progressive, problem-solving intentions 
have failed to gain traction because of his lack of 
political capital, but the end result looks much 
like a continuing tradition of broken promises, 
stirring rhetoric, and duplicitous actions. It is time 
to look more critically beyond the progress that 
Jokowi represented when he stood next to rival 
presidential candidate and former army General 
Prabowo Subianto. Now, as Jokowi needs to prove 
his nationalistic, conservative, and pro-security 
credentials, it seems more likely that Papua is 
helping him than the other way around. 
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Endnotes
1.   Critics say that the permit requirement, coupled with 
intimidation and detention of journalists, has been used 
to enforce a de facto ban on foreign media in Papua. 
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